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Abstract
A unilateral policy intervention by a country (such as the introduction of an
emission price) can induce firms to relocate to other countries. We analyze a dy-
namic game where a regulator offers contracts to avert relocation of a firm in each of
two periods. The firm can undertake a location-specific investment (e.g., in abate-
ment capital). Contracts can be written on some contractible productive activity
(e.g., emissions), but the firm’s investment is not contractible. A moral hazard
problem arises under short-term contracting that makes it impossible to implement
outcomes with positive transfers in the second period. The regulator resorts to
high-powered incentives in the first period. The firm then overinvests and a lock-in
effect prevents relocation in both periods. Paradoxically, the distortion in the first-
period contract can be so severe that higher transfers are needed to avert relocation
compared to a (hypothetical) situation without the investment opportunity.
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1 Introduction
In a globalized world economy, a firm’s location is a strategic choice. Changes in tax
regimes, market conditions, or regulations can render production more profitable in one
country compared to another, and may induce firms to relocate or outsource production
to other countries. Policy makers often perceive such relocation as harmful, because it can
cause losses of jobs or reductions in tax revenues. Hence, they sometimes take measures
to prevent firms from relocating, or try to design policies that minimize the incentives
for firms to relocate.1
We study the issue of firm relocation in a dynamic setting, where a local regulator seeks
to prevent the relocation of a firm to some other country in each of two periods.2 The firm
can undertake a location-specific investment that is neither observable to the regulator
nor verifiable and, hence, not contractible. The regulator, however, can make transfer
payments to the firm contingent on other indicators of the firm’s productive activity, such
as its output or emissions. While the firm’s optimal choice of these activities is related
to the investment, they are not fully revealing – some activities remain unobservable to
the regulator so that the firm’s investment cannot be inferred.
We show that a moral hazard problem arises when contracts can only be written on
a short-term basis, so that the regulator must offer to the firm a new set of contracts
in each period. Such short-term contracting is especially relevant because with changing
majorities and legislations, regulators or policy makers may not be able to commit to
contractual obligations and future regulations for a sufficiently long period of time. In
particular, because firms’ location decisions and investments related with them are usually
long-term, limited commitment is likely to be a major concern in this context. Under
short-term contracting, the firm can adopt a ‘take-the-money-and-run strategy’. In this
case, the firm stays for only one period in its home country and benefits from first-period
transfers, but (secretly) lowers its investment, planning to relocate in period 2. We
demonstrate that under limited commitment, a moral hazard problem arises that leads
to distortions in the allocation.
As a benchmark case, we first consider long-term contracting (‘full commitment’).
In this case, the regulator can offer contracts to the firm that last for two periods and
specify transfers as well as the firm’s choice of its (verifiable) production decisions for
both periods. The regulator’s problem under long-term contracting is simple, because
the interests of the regulator and the firm are to some extent aligned. While the firm
1For example, in 1999 the Finnish telecommunications company Nokia received a subsidy from
the German state North Rhine-Westphalia to maintain production of mobile phones in the region.
The subsidy was conditioned upon a guarantee to maintain at least 2.856 full-time jobs. Never-
theless, in 2008 Nokia announced plans to shut down production and finally relocated to Romania.
For more details see www.spiegel.de/international/germany/the-world-from-berlin-nokia-under-attack-
in-germany-a-529218.html.
2We discuss the relevant literature and its relation to our findings in the next subsection.
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seeks to maximize its profits, the regulator seeks to avert the firm’s relocation at minimal
costs, which requires maximal profits. Hence, all productive variables are set to their
profit-maximizing levels, and the transfer just compensates the firm for not relocating.
This picture changes drastically under limited commitment, where only short-term
contracts can be utilized. In this case, the regulator cannot commit to any transfer in the
second period that is larger than what is required to avert relocation within that period.
Furthermore, the firm is free to relocate in period 2 without accepting any contract offer
in that period. And whenever the firm plans to relocate in the second period, it lowers
its investment in period 1. A larger transfer in period 2 would then be required to avert
relocation, but the regulator does not observe the firm’s under-investment. The resulting
conflict between the regulator’s parsimony (averting relocation with minimal transfers in
period 2) and the firm’s opportunism (reducing the investment in period 1, planning to
relocate in period 2) leads to a dilemma: no outcomes can be implemented that involve
any positive transfers in period 2.
To circumvent this implementation problem, the regulator often tightens the regula-
tion in the first period, in order to incentivize the firm to invest more. If the regulation
is sufficiently tight, a ‘lock-in effect’ arises: adopting a take-the-money-and-run strategy
is then no longer profitable for the firm. Hence, even without transfers in period 2, the
firm prefers to stay permanently, and invests accordingly. The regulator, thus, exploits
the lock-in effect of the investment to preempt the implementation problem.
More specifically, we show that the optimal long-term contract is only implementable
under short-term contracting if relocation is not very attractive. Otherwise, the imple-
mentation problem arises. The regulator then resorts to more high-powered incentives
in the first period, in order to induce the firm to invest more. This leads to an over-
investment, compared to what would have been optimal under full commitment. If the
relocation option is sufficiently attractive, the resulting distortion in the final outcome can
be so severe that higher transfers are required to avert relocation than in a hypothetical
situation where the firm’s investment opportunity does not exist.
From a policy perspective, our analysis indicates that transfers conditioned only on
the location of a firm at a certain point in time (i.e., within a period) may be less effective
in averting relocation on a permanent basis than regulations that involve also binding
targets for a firm’s output or employment. To account for the implementation problem,
contracts should be tougher early on, to induce a higher investment by the firm.
An interesting and timely application of our general model can be found in the context
of climate policy.3 It is well-known that a unilateral introduction of an emission price by a
3An alternative application features a regulator (or principal) who seeks to induce a pharmaceutical
company (or agent) to develop a new drug. The model developed in this paper applies if the regulator
cannot observe the firm’s overall R&D effort to develop the drug, but can subsidize investments in
research equipment. Under limited commitment, the firm can pocket any transfers that take place in
the first period, and quit the project in the second period.
3
country can induce firms to relocate to other countries with less stringent environmental
regulation (‘pollution haven hypothesis’). Firm relocation is an important channel of
‘carbon leakage’, or more generally the leakage of emissions to other countries.4 The
problem of firm relocation may be particularly relevant for policy makers given their
concern for jobs and international competitiveness. To foster intuition, we therefore
frame our general analysis in the context of this environmental application. Hence, we
will refer to the firm’s observable activity as emissions, while other activities of the firm
(such as output) remain unobservable to the regulator. If the firm stays in its home
country for at least one period, it can undertake an investment in abatement capital or
in some low-carbon technologies that allow the firm to reduce its operating costs in the
light of an emission price established in the home country. In this context, transfers may,
e.g., be implemented by allocating emission allowances to firms for free during an early
phase of a cap-and-trade scheme. Our results indicate that in order to have a permanent
effect upon firms’ location decisions, the allocation of emission permits should be made
contingent on observable measures of a firm’s productive activity (such as emissions or
output), rather than on the basis of a firm’s past emissions (so-called ‘grandfathering’;
see Schmidt and Heitzig (2014)).
Related Literature
Our paper contributes to a growing body of literature that tackles the problem of lim-
ited commitment in repeated moral hazard problems. E.g., Manso (2011) considers the
problem of an agent who is motivated to innovate. The optimal long-term contract that
induces the agent to experiment is shown not to be implementable with a sequence of
short-term contracts. It is further shown that under certain conditions, outcomes with
experimentation completely fail to be implementable. Bergemann and Hege (1998) study
the problem of providing venture capital in a dynamic agency model and argue that
short-term contracts can never substitute long-term contracts. In their model, however,
problems of implementation do not arise. In another paper, Bergemann and Hege (2005)
study the funding of a research project with uncertain return and date of completion.
Only short-term contracts are considered and a distinction is made between observable
and unobservable effort. As opposed to our results, they show that unobservable effort
leads to a Pareto-superior outcome, compared to observable investment.
The more general literature on repeated moral hazard is surveyed by Chiappori et al.
(1994), who derive a principal’s optimal contract when motivating an agent to exert costly
effort. Rey and Salanie´ (1990) and Fudenberg et al. (1990) provide sufficient conditions
for the implementability of the optimal long-term contract via a sequence of short-term
contracts. However, they do not characterize the sequence of short-term contracts when
4Another channel is via changes in fossil fuel prices. For an overview, see Babiker (2005).
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the optimal long-term contract is not implementable. Fudenberg et al. (1990) report two
examples for environments where optimal long-term contracts fail to be implementable
with short-term contracts, but do not go deeper into this problem.5
Our setting also embodies a form of the ratchet effect. Pioneered by Weitzman (1980),
the ratchet effect has found its ways into the literature on contracting with limited com-
mitment. Examples are Lazear (1986), Gibbons (1986), Freixas et al. (1985), and Laffont
and Tirole (1988). While Lazear (1986) argues that high-powered incentives can over-
come the ratchet effect, Laffont and Tirole (1988) prove a result on the impossibility of
implementing full separation with a continuum of types. All these works study models
of adverse selection. The issue is then to compensate the agent today for being exploited
in the future, because ex-ante private information is typically revealed over time. We
instead study a model of moral hazard, where the exploitation in the future has severe
consequences on the problem of implementing effort in the first place.
A recent paper that studies the ratchet effect in a model with moral hazard is Bhaskar
(2014). He studies a dynamic principal-agent problem with moral hazard and learning.
The difficulty of the job, undertaken by the agent, is a priori unknown to both parties.
Conditional on first-period effort and output, both principal and agent update their
beliefs. When shirking, the agent’s posterior differs from the principal’s, which gives rise
to a ratchet effect that leads to a failure of implementability that is similar to the one
presented in our paper. The agent can adopt a ‘take-the-money-and-run’ strategy, which
makes deviations from interior values profitable.
Due to the commitment problem under short-term contracting, our paper is also
related to the literature on incomplete contracts, e.g. Hart and Moore (1988). As in
this literature, we allow contracts to depend on some observable characteristics, but not
on investments. Our analysis of short-term contracting establishes a new channel for a
contractual hold-up: although the contracts we analyze are rich enough to mitigate hold-
up within a period (or under full commitment), the threat of exploitation in future periods
resurrects the hold-up problem under limited commitment. As compared to the classical
results in that literature (see Che and Sa´kovics (2004) for an overview), we identify over-
investment as another possible consequence of incomplete contracting. Joskow (1987)
finds empirical evidence for a link between the contractual commitments of future trade
and importance of relationship-specific investment. Our paper provides a theoretical
foundation: when the contract length falls short of the time in which investments are
recouped, efficient investment cannot be implemented.
In a model of repeated climate contracting between countries, Harstad (2012) finds
results that are related to ours. Countries repeatedly negotiate climate contracts that
specify emission levels. Between the contracting stages they invest in abatement tech-
5Our model can be seen as a version of Example 1 in Fudenberg et al. (1990). The intuition behind
their Example 2, however, fits better with the observed implementation problem in our paper.
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nology. The author finds that shorter contract duration leads to tougher contracts and
lower emission levels are agreed upon. However, investments remain at an inefficiently
low level, whereas in our model contracts are tougher and investments are inefficiently
high.
The problem of firm relocation has been studied in different strands of literature.
Horstmann and Markusen (1992), e.g., study the impact of a trade policy on market
structure. They report that ‘small policy changes can produce large welfare effects when
equilibrium market structure shifts’. Also tax competition in general affects firm location,
Wilson and Wildasin (2004) and Bucovetsky (2005) provide an overview.6 The impact
of unilateral environmental regulation on firms’ location decisions was first analyzed for-
mally by Markusen et al. (1993).7 In a two-country model, firms decide where to locate
after governments have determined environmental taxes. Firms’ location decisions are,
therefore, very sensitive to differences in tax policies, as confirmed by Ulph (1994) in
a numerical calibration of the model. Our paper complements this literature in that it
provides a method to counterbalance the adverse effects on firm location.
Schmidt and Heitzig (2014) study the dynamics of ‘grandfathering’ schemes. They
show that such transfer schemes can permanently avert firm relocation even when they
terminate in finite time. In contrast to our paper, full contractual commitment by the
regulator is assumed. Their findings conform with our results on long-term contracting. In
particular, with full commitment, simple transfer schemes are sufficient, as the regulator
need not interfere directly with the firm’s productive decisions. The promise of transfers
that last for a sufficiently long period of time induces the optimal investment by the firm,
and permanently averts its relocation. With limited commitment, however, our results
indicate that these simple grandfathering schemes are no longer optimal and contracts
should be made contingent on other observable characteristics, such as emissions.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the model
and Section 3 studies the relocation issue when the firm is not regulated. Section 4.1 char-
acterizes the benchmark case of long-term contracting. Short-term contracting is investi-
gated in Section 4.2. Extensions of the model, such as an observable but non-contractible
investment, and an alternative objective function of the regulator that depends directly
on the firm’s emissions, are presented in Section 5. They serve us as a robustness check.
Section 6 concludes. All formal proofs are relegated to the Appendix.
6See also Haufler and Wooton (2010).
7See also Markusen et al. (1995). Other examples include Motta and Thisse (1994), who analyze the
relocation of firms already established in their home country in response to a unilateral anti-pollution
policy pursued by the government in their home country. Further, Ulph and Valentini (1997) analyze
strategic environmental policy in a setting where different sectors are linked via an input-output relation.
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2 Model
2.1 The firm
We analyze the following two-period model: There is one firm that is initially located
in country A, where it earns per-period profits of piA(e, a). The variable e reflects some
productive activity, and a is the stock of capital available to the firm. For illustrative
purposes, we will interpret these variables in terms of our environmental example (moti-
vated in the introduction) throughout the paper. Then e stands for the firm’s emissions,
and a is the firm’s stock of abatement capital. Note that the profit function piA(e, a) is
given in a reduced form. In particular, all other potential factors (e.g. input and output
quantities, prices) are always chosen optimally by the firm, for any given values of e and
a. Below, we show how to derive the firm’s profit in the reduced form piA(e, a) in a
specific example.
Emission levels are chosen by the firm in each period, and we denote eτ the emission
level in period τ ∈ {1, 2}. The capital stock a is established at the beginning of period
1 and is thereafter available for both periods of production.8 We further assume that
abatement capital is immobile, i.e. it can only be utilized in country A.9 The cost of
installing a capital stock of a ≥ 0 is given by the strictly convex cost function K(a), with
K(0) = K ′(0) = 0. The firm’s discounted profit from producing in country A in both
periods, when choosing emission levels e1 and e2 as well as capital a is, therefore,
piA(e1, a) − K(a) + δpiA(e2, a), (1)
where δ > 0 is the discount factor.10
We assume that at the beginning of each period, the firm has the possibility to relocate
to some other country, in the following referred to as ‘country B’. In country B, the firm
earns a fixed per-period profit of piB.
11 Relocation is once and for all, and for simplicity
assumed to be costless. If the firm relocates immediately (i.e. at the beginning of period
1) to country B, it earns a total profit of
VB = (1+ δ)piB. (2)
In this case, the firm has no incentive to invest in abatement capital. The firm can also
8In particular, we assume away depreciation. Allowing for a positive rate of depreciation would,
however, not change our main results.
9Examples include investments in more energy-efficient production technologies, or investments in
physical capital such as a building.
10We allow for δ > 1, which admits time periods of different length and/or economic importance.
11In the context of our environmental example, country B may, e.g., be a country that does not regulate
emissions. Hence, even if capital were mobile, a prior investment in abatement capital does not affect
the firm’s profit after relocation.
7
stay in A for only one period, and relocate to B at the beginning of period 2. This
strategy, referred to as ‘location plan AB’, amounts to a discounted profit of
piA(e1, a) − K(a) + δpiB. (3)
We use the following technical assumptions regarding the profit function piA(e, a), defined
on an open interval (e, e), with −∞ ≤ e < e ≤∞.12
Assumptions:
(A1) piA(e, a) is strictly concave in e, and for all a ≥ 0 we have ∂piA∂e = +∞ for e → e,
as well as
∂piA
∂e < 0 for e→ e.
(A2) piA(e, a) is strictly concave in a, and
∂piA
∂a > 0 holds at a = 0 for all e ∈ (e, e);
furthermore,
∂piA
∂a is bounded from above for all e ∈ (e, e).
(A3) The Hessian of piA(e, a) is negative definite.
(A4)
∂2piA
∂e∂a < 0.
(A5) ∃ ε > 0 such that whenever ∂piA/∂e = 0 then ∂piA/∂a > ε.
The first three assumptions are technical: (A1) states that piA(e, a) is a regular profit
function in e for all possible values of a (i.e., there exists a unique interior maximizer) and
rules out boundary solutions for e. Assumption (A2) implies that investment exhibits
diminishing returns, and it is never optimal to choose a = 0 (unless the firm relocates
immediately). (A3) guarantees concavity of implicitly defined functions (such functions
are introduced later on).
The last two assumptions describe the relation between emissions and investment: (A4)
is a single-crossing property, and implies that emissions and investment are substitutes.13
Assumption (A5) implies that whenever the firm is free to choose e optimally, it is always
better off with a larger capital stock when the investment costs in a are ignored.
Example. Consider a polluting firm that produces an output quantity q, emitting e units
of greenhouse gases. The firm faces the inverse demand P(q) = 3−q/2. Marginal costs of
production are constant and normalized to zero. The emissions price in A (e.g., following
the introduction of a cap-and-trade scheme) is equal to 1 in both periods. Consequently,
the firm’s per-period profit in country A, gross of abatement capital installation cost, is
p˜iA(e, q) = (3− q/2)q− e.
12Negative values for e can be interpreted as selling emission rights on the market.
13Intuitively, if the firm has a larger abatement capital stock then its optimal emissions are lower.
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Emissions are a function of output and the firm’s abatement capital stock. For simplicity,
we assume that the firm’s emissions are additive in q and a, i.e. e(q, a) = q−a. Inserting
this into p˜iA(e, q), we obtain the firm’s profit function in the reduced form:
14
piA(e, a) = 3a+ 2e− (a+ e)
2/2. (4)
We will return to this simple example frequently throughout the paper, in order to illus-
trate our findings.
2.2 The regulator
In country A a regulator (or policy maker) is concerned with the firm’s option to relocate.
In particular, as soon as the firm relocates, welfare in country A is reduced by some fixed
amount L > 0, e.g., due to job losses or lower tax revenues.15
Because of the potential loss L, the regulator’s main interest is to avert relocation of
the firm on a permanent basis. To this end, the regulator offers to the firm contracts
in a take-it-or-leave-it manner. We assume that the firm’s emissions in each period are
contractible. However, the investment in abatement capital is neither observable to the
regulator nor verifiable. Contracts thus specify a location-specific transfer to the firm,
denoted by t, and emission levels that the firm has to comply with (in order to obtain
the transfer). The firm can reject any contract offer and either relocate to country B, or
produce in country A at its own, un-subsidized expense.
The regulator maximizes the following welfare function
W = −χ1 t1 − χ2 δt2 − (1− χ2)L, (5)
where χτ = 1 if the firm operates in country A in period τ (and accepts the contract
offered in that period), and χτ = 0 otherwise.
16 The regulator and the firm use the same
discount factor δ > 0.
Throughout the paper, we distinguish between long-term and short-term contracts.
The former specify emission levels and transfers for each individual period, i.e. a long-
term contract is a quadruple (t1, e1, t2, e2). This implicitly assumes that the regulator
14It is easy to verify that the function piA(e, a) fulfills our earlier assumptions.
15The assumption that L is independent of whether the firm relocates in period 1 or in period 2
highlights the regulator’s interest in averting relocation on a permanent basis (rather than on a temporary
one). In our environmental example, an emission price is implemented by some higher authority (e.g., on
the federal level), while transfers are paid by a local regulator who’s primary objective it is to avert the
firm’s relocation. Hence, the firm’s emissions do not directly affect the regulator’s payoff. In Section 5,
we introduce an alternative payoff function for the regulator that also depends on the firm’s choice of e,
as well as on the period in which the firm relocates. The regulator may then also benefit from averting
relocation only in period 1. We will show that our main results are unaffected by these changes.
16Because relocation is by assumption irreversible, χ2 = 1 requires that also χ1 = 1 holds.
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can fully commit to all present and future contractual obligations. Commitment here is
two-sided, i.e. also the firm, after signing the contract, is committed to staying in country
A throughout the contract duration.17
The timing with long-term contracting is as follows. First, the regulator offers a
contract. After observing the contract offer, the firm decides whether or not to relocate
to country B. If the firm relocates, the game ends. Otherwise, it decides whether or not
to accept the contract, and chooses a level of abatement capital investment.18 Finally,
production starts under the terms specified in the contract or, in case no contract was
signed, the firm chooses its productive variables.
Under short-term contracting neither the regulator nor the firm have the ability to
make commitments that last for more than one period.19 Hence, the regulator resorts to
a sequence of spot contracts (tτ, eτ). The timing for this case is as follows.
1. Regulator offers contract (t1, e1).
2. Firm accepts/rejects and location choice A/B.
3. Firm chooses a and produces e1. Transfer t1 paid to the firm.
4. Regulator offers contract (t2, e2).
5. Firm accepts/rejects and location A/B.
6. Firm produces e2. Transfer t2 paid to the firm.
In the first period a short-term contract (t1, e1) is offered to the firm. After observing the
contract, the firm decides on its location and whether or not to accept the contract. The
game ends whenever the firm relocates. Otherwise, the firm invests in abatement capital
and production takes place (according to the terms specified in the contract if accepted).
At the end of period 1, the transfer is paid to the firm, in case it accepted the contract.
Period 2 starts with a new contract offer (t2, e2) by the regulator (unless the firm already
relocated in period 1). The firm observes the offered contract and decides whether or not
to relocate in period 2. If it stays in A, the firm can accept the contract and produce
according to the contractual terms or reject the contract, in which case it produces on its
own account and does not receive any transfer payment in period 2. Again, the transfer
is paid at the end of period 2.
17This formulation rules out contracts that keep the firm for the first period and impose relocation in
the second period. Because such contracts are never desirable, their exclusion is without loss.
18The firm’s decisions within a period are, of course, simultaneous.
19Intermediate cases of one-sided commitment are simple in our model. E.g., if the regulator has full
commitment power but not the firm, postponing all transfers to period 2 – after the option to relocate
has vanished – is sufficient to implement the full commitment outcome.
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2.3 Equilibrium concept
We argue in the following that even though we study a dynamic game with imperfect
information, we can use Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium (SPNE) as our solution con-
cept, and hence, backward induction as solution method. This is obvious in the case of
long-term contracting where the regulator moves only once and all remaining decisions
are taken by the firm (after observing the long-term contract offered by the regulator).
Under short-term contracting, there is no proper subgame after stage 3 (see above),
because the regulator does not observe the firm’s choice of a. However, stages 5 and
6 constitute a proper subgame, because the firm has perfect recall. Furthermore, the
sequentiality of stages 3 and 4 (firm’s choice of a and second-period contract offer (t2, e2))
is inconsequential for the equilibrium outcome because no information is revealed between
these two stages. Hence, we can effectively treat these two stages as simultaneous moves.
This allows us to solve the game by backward induction.20
Furthermore, throughout the main part of the paper we focus on pure strategies. This
is clearly without loss of generality when we analyze long-term contracts. With short-
term contracting, randomization could be beneficial when the firm chooses its investment.
However, as we formally prove in Appendix B, there are no additional equilibria in mixed
strategies. Hence, focusing on pure strategy equilibria is without loss of generality also
in the case of short-term contracting.
3 Preliminaries and the ‘no-regulation’ benchmark
In this section we consider the firm’s problem in isolation and identify conditions under
which relocation occurs. It will turn out convenient to use the following short-hand
notations. Let
pi∗A(a) = maxe piA(e, a) (6)
be the firm’s maximal profit in one period after having installed capital stock a. Denote
e∗(a) the corresponding level of emissions. Using this, we can define
VA(e1) = max
a
(
piA(e1, a) − K(a) + δpi
∗
A(a)
)
. (7)
This represents the firm’s discounted profit when staying in country A in both periods,
with first-period emissions fixed (e.g., in a contract) at a level of e1, while choosing e2
optimally in period 2, and choosing a optimally in period 1. The corresponding optimal
20The alternative would be to use Perfect Bayesian Nash Equilibrium. This requires specifying beliefs
of the regulator in stage 4 about the firm’s choice of investment. Because of the simple structure, these
PBNE correspond to the SPNE.
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level of investment is denoted by aA(e1). Similarly,
VAB(e1) = max
a
(
piA(e1, a) − K(a) + δpiB
)
(8)
is the firm’s profit under location plan AB with first-period emissions e1, given an optimal
investment for this location plan. The corresponding maximizer is denoted by aAB(e1).
The following Lemma states properties of these functions and their maximizers.
Lemma 1. (1) e∗(a) is unique and strictly decreasing,
(2) pi∗A(a) is strictly increasing, concave, and lima→∞ pi∗A(a) = +∞,
(3) aA(e1) and aAB(e1) are unique and strictly decreasing,
(4) VA(e1) and VAB(e1) are strictly concave and have unique maximizers,
(5) aA(e1) > aAB(e1) for all e1 ∈ (e, e).
The first result confirms that a firm that has installed a larger abatement capital stock
optimally chooses lower emissions. The second result rephrases our earlier assumption
(A5) that ∂piA/∂e = 0 implies ∂piA/∂a > 0 and provides a first indication towards a lock-
in effect, namely a sufficiently large investment renders relocation unprofitable even for
large values of piB. The functions aA(e1) and aAB(e1) are decreasing because in our model
a stricter regulation in the first period corresponds to a smaller value of e1 (emissions are
regulated more tightly). Accordingly, the firm responds with a larger investment when
e1 is smaller (both under location plan AB or when the firm plans to stay permanently
in A). The final result says that if the firm plans to stay in A in both periods, it invests
more than when it plans to relocate after one period.
The next lemma is an immediate consequence of the investment cost being sunk.
Lemma 2. For any level of first-period emissions, the option to relocate after one period is
always inferior to either immediate relocation or no relocation (or both). More specifically,
it holds for any e1 that VAB(e1) < max{VA(e1), VB}.
The Lemma establishes a lock-in effect. Whenever the firm finds it optimal to stay
for one period in country A, it will undertake some investment. Intuitively, location plan
AB can only be optimal if the net profit in period 1, i.e. profit from production minus
the cost of installing capital, exceeds the profit in country B. But then the corresponding
per-period profit of production in country A, gross of investment costs, clearly exceeds
piB when the firm implements aAB(e1). So it must be profitable for the firm to stay in
country A also for the second period. By raising its investment to the level aA(e1), the
firm can achieve an even higher profit.
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Figure 1: Profit functions VA(e1), VAB(e1), and VB for low piB (left) and high piB (right).
Figure 1 illustrates the typical shape of the firm’s profit function for the different
location plans. Note, that raising piB does not affect VA, whereas it shifts VAB as well as
VB upwards.
According to Lemma 2, the firm prefers either to stay in country A for both periods
or to relocate immediately. Only the latter case is of interest for us, since it calls for
regulatory intervention. To make this more precise, let eoA be the optimal (first-period)
emission level when the firm plans to stay in country A for both periods. It is given by
eoA = argmaxe1
VA(e1). (9)
Because the firm uses the same capital stock in each period, it is straightforward to verify
that given this optimal choice of first-period emissions, it holds that e2 = e1 = e
o
A if the
firm is free to choose its emissions in period 2. Define VoA := VA(e
o
A) and a
o
A := aA(e
o
A).
The following lemma is an immediate consequence of the preceding derivations.
Lemma 3. Absent regulatory intervention, the firm strictly prefers immediate relocation
whenever piB > pi
o
B, and no relocation otherwise. The critical value pi
o
B is given by
pioB :=
VoA
1+ δ
. (10)
Throughout the rest of the paper we maintain the assumption that piB ≥ pioB. Hence, in
the absence of regulatory intervention the firm relocates immediately.
Example. Maximizing piA(e, a) = 3a + 2e − (a + e)
2/2 over e, we find that the firm’s
optimal emissions (given a) are e∗(a) = 2−a. Therefore pi∗A(a) = 2+a. Let investment
costs be given by the quadratic cost function K(a) = a2/2. If the firm plans to stay in
country A in both periods, and is constrained to emit (no more than) e1 units in period
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1 (e.g., by the regulator), it thus solves:
max
a
3a+ 2e1 −
(a+ e1)
2
2
−
a2
2
+ δ(2+ a).
This yields aA(e1) = (3− e1+ δ)/2 and VA(e1) =
1
2(5+ δ)(1+ δ)−
1
4(e1−(1− δ))
2. The
latter implies eoA = 1− δ and V
o
A =
1
2(5+ δ)(1+ δ). The critical level of piB for relocation
is pioB =
1
2(5+ δ). If the firm plans to stay in country A for only one period, it solves:
max
a
3a+ 2e1 −
(a+ e1)
2
2
−
a2
2
+ δpiB.
This yields aAB(e1) = (3−e1)/2, and VAB(e1) =
5
2−
1
4(e1−1)
2+δpiB. The firm’s optimal
choice of first-period emissions is eAB = 1. Observe that the firm’s emissions are higher
and the abatement capital investment is smaller when it plans to relocate after one period
(we find aoA = 1+ δ and aAB = 1).
4 Regulation
This section studies the optimal regulatory policy in the presence of the threat of firm
relocation. We first analyze the benchmark case of long-term contracting (full commit-
ment), and then proceed to short-term contracting (limited commitment).
4.1 Long-term contracting
The regulator’s payoff from not offering a contract is −L. Alternatively, the regulator can
offer a long-term contract that requires the firm to produce in country A in both periods.
In finding the optimal contract that permanently averts relocation, the regulator solves
the following program
min
t1,e1,t2,e2,a
t1 + δt2
s.t. t1 + piA(e1, a) − K(a) + δ
(
t2 + piA(e2, a)
) ≥ VB , and (PC)
t1 + piA(e1, a) − K(a) + δ
(
t2 + piA(e2, a)
) ≥
t1 + piA(e1, a˜) − K(a˜) + δ
(
t2 + piA(e2, a˜)
) ∀a˜. (MH-1)
The participation constraint (PC) ensures that the firm prefers accepting the contract
(and not relocating) to immediate relocation. Constraint (MH-1) is a moral hazard con-
straint, that ensures the firm chooses the intended level of investment. Because we assume
two-sided commitment, the distribution of transfers across periods is inconsequential and
we can substitute for the total transfer t = t1 + δt2.
21
21This also relies on the assumption that regulator and firm have a common discount factor. With
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Obviously the participation constraint (PC) is binding. Together with the moral
hazard constraint (MH-1) the minimal (total) transfer t that is required to avert relocation
in both periods when emissions are chosen at levels e1 and e2 is
t = VB − max
a
(
piA(e1, a) − K(a) + δpiA(e2, a)
)
. (11)
The regulator’s minimization program given above, therefore, corresponds to mini-
mizing (11) with respect to e1 and e2. This is equivalent to maximizing VA(e1) over
e1, which yields e1 = e
o
A as defined in (9). The minimal total transfer required to avert
relocation is, therefore, t = VB − V
o
A, and the regulator, accounting for the welfare loss
from relocation, offers a contract that averts relocation if and only if this transfer does
not exceed L. The following proposition summarizes.
Proposition 1. The optimal long-term contract specifies e1 = e2 = e
o
A, pays a total
transfer of to := VB − V
o
A and the firm does not relocate, whenever L ≥ to. Otherwise,
the regulator offers the null contract and the firm relocates immediately.
Notice the following alternative way of implementing the optimal long-term contract:
Because of full commitment on the side of the firm, the regulator can simply offer the
lump-sum subsidy to for the firm’s commitment not to relocate in any of the two periods.
This leaves the optimal choices of e1 and e2 at the firm’s discretion. The firm then chooses
emissions and investment so as to maximize its discounted profit from two periods of
production in country A. But this implies e1 = e2 = e
o
A and a = a
o
A, as we have shown
in Section 3. Acceptance of the subsidy to is implied by its definition in Proposition 1.
Hence, under full commitment, a simple location-based subsidization is sufficient to avert
firm relocation with minimal transfers; the regulator does not need to interfere directly
with the firm’s productive activities.
Example. Applying Proposition 1, the optimal long-term contract specifies emission
targets e1 = e2 = e
o
A = 1− δ. The firm’s discounted profit in A is V
o
A =
1
2(1+ δ)(5+ δ),
and a total transfer of to = VB−V
o
A = (1+δ)
[
piB−
1
2(5+δ)
]
is required to avert relocation.
From the expression for to we also get pioB =
1
2(5+ δ).
4.2 Short-term contracting
We move on to the study of short-term contracting. Hence, we assume that the regulator
cannot commit to a contract that specifies emissions and transfers for both periods and
instead resorts to a sequence of short-term contracts. Also the firm cannot commit in
period 1 to not relocating in period 2.
differing discount factors, the regulator would have a preference for either paying all transfers in period
1 or in period 2.
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For each contracting party, limited commitment generates a new constraint. First, the
regulator’s second-period contract offer must be sequentially optimal. In particular, the
second-period transfer can be no higher than required to avert relocation in that period.
Second, the firm has the option to accept the first-period contract but nevertheless relo-
cate in period 2. In order to prevent this, a sufficiently large second-period transfer has to
be ‘promised’. We show in this section that these two restrictions can only be compatible
if the latter constraint is irrelevant, i.e. upon accepting the first-period contract the firm
already prefers to stay for two periods and planned relocation is inferior. To achieve this,
the regulator sets a stringent (i.e. low) first-period emission target e1. This induces a
lock-in that prevents relocation in both periods without transfers in period 2.
As before, offering no contract results in a welfare of −L. The relevant alternative to
the null contract in period 1 is a contract offer that is accepted by the firm, and leads
to an outcome where the firm does not relocate in period 2. Acceptance of the first-
period contract, while taking the continuation play as given, is induced by constraint
(PC). Similarly, the constraint for the firm choosing investment a provided it accepts
the respective contracts in each of the two periods is given by (MH-1).
Furthermore, after having installed capital stock a in period 1, the firm is will-
ing to accept the second-period contract offer (t2, e2) if and only if t2 + piA(e2, a) ≥
max{piB, pi
∗
A(a)}. Note that the firm has the option to produce in A at its own expense,
earning a maximal profit of pi∗A(a), which leads to zero transfers for large values of a.
Hence, the second-period contract (t2, e2) is sequentially optimally provided the firm
invests a, whenever
t2 = max{0, piB − pi
∗
A(a)}, e2 = e
∗(a). (SO)
As in the case of long-term contracting, the regulator’s and the firm’s interests are to
some extent aligned: minimizing the transfer payment, the regulator seeks to maximize
the firm’s profit over e2. What is crucial is that whenever t2 > 0, this transfer just
compensates the firm for not relocating in period 2. However, if pi∗A(a) ≥ piB, then no
second-period transfer is required.22
The other new constraint concerns the firm’s possibility to (secretely) plan relocation.
Doing so, after having accepted the first-period contract (t1, e1), the firm chooses invest-
ment aAB(e1), and earns a discounted profit of t1+VAB(e1). This leads to the additional
moral hazard constraint
t1 + piA(e1, a) − K(a) + δ
(
t2 + piA(e2, a)
) ≥ t1 + VAB(e1). (MH-2)
The regulator’s problem of finding the minimal transfer(s) that permanently avert
22We assume that when pi∗A(a) ≥ piB, the firm still accepts a contract offer with t2 = 0 and emissions
at the level e2 = e
∗(a).
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relocation can, therefore, be stated as follows:
min
t1,e1,t2,e2,a
t1 + δt2, subject to (PC), (MH-1), (MH-2), (SO). (PS)
Before solving problem PS, let us first characterize the set of first-period emission
levels that induce an equilibrium in the continuation game where the firm never relocates.
Hence, we are looking for levels of e1 for which there exists a contract (t2, e2) and an
investment level a such that constraints (MH-1),(MH-2), and (SO) are satisfied. Notice
that constraint (SO) essentially pins down (t2, e2) for a given level of investment a.
Similarly, for a given second-period emission level e2, we can derive a from constraint
(MH-1).23 Using the latter condition and e2 = e
∗(a), we can thus rewrite constraint
(MH-2) as follows
δt2 + VA(e1) ≥ VAB(e1). (MH-2′)
In this representation the role of the second-period transfer becomes clear. When
investing, the firm faces two options: Either it invests little and relocates in period
2, rejecting the second-period contract offer. Or it invests more, planning to stay in
A in both periods and accepting the second-period contract offer. Because the actual
investment level is not observable to the regulator, the second-period offer cannot be made
contingent on it. When seeking to implement an outcome where the firm never relocates,
the second-period contract offer (t2, e2) is implicitly contingent on the optimal investment
level for the second option (no planned relocation), by conditions (MH-1) and (SO). But
the resulting second-period transfer has to compensate the firm also for not secretly under-
investing, i.e., by condition (MH-2′), it has to hold that δt2 ≥ VAB(e1) − VA(e1). The
following result shows that this condition restricts the range of implementable outcomes.
Proposition 2. For a first-period emission level e1, there exists a second-period contract
(t2, e2) and an investment level a such that constraints (MH-1), (MH-2), and (SO) are
satisfied if and only if VA(e1) ≥ VAB(e1).
If the condition in the proposition is met, constraint (MH-2) has no bite. This can be
seen best from its reformulation into (MH-2′). Provided that VA(e1) ≥ VAB(e1), any non-
negative transfer t2 satisfies the constraint. If, however, VA(e1) < VAB(e1), constraint
(MH-2′) imposes a lower bound on t2, as argued above. Intuitively, in order to satisfy
constraint (MH-2′), the second-period transfer not only has to account for the difference
in second-period profits, but also for the respective difference in first-period profits that
arises when the firm plans to stay in A in both periods, rather than to relocate after
period 1. In particular, because the underlying investments differ in the two cases, first-
period profits are strictly higher with planned relocation compared to no relocation, and
23This is also what we have done when deriving the optimal long-term contract. Note, that any
combination e1, e2 leads to a unique investment level.
17
the second-period transfer – serving as reward – has to compensate for this difference.
However, because the regulator has no commitment power, offering such a reward is not
credible. Any sequentially optimal second-period transfer, i.e., any t2 that satisfies (SO)
only compensates the firm for not relocating within that period, and fails to take into
account investment costs that were incurred prior to this period.
Notice a crucial consequence of Proposition 2: the condition VA(e1) ≥ VAB(e1) implies
that no second-period transfer is required to avert relocation in period 2. In other words,
an equilibrium with no relocation under short-term contracting necessarily implies a
situation where the firm is locked-in after the first period.
Proposition 2 also allows us to determine when the optimal long-term contract is
implementable via a sequence of short-term contracts:
Corollary 1. The optimal long-term contract can be implemented via a sequence of short-
term contracts if and only if VoA ≥ VAB(eoA). This is equivalent to piB ≤ pi]B, where
pi]B :=
1
δ
(
VoA − piA(e
o
A, aAB(e
o
A)) + K(aAB(e
o
A))
)
> pioB.
The respective sequence of contracts entails (t1, e1) = (t
o, eoA), and (t2, e2) = (0, e
o
A).
We now proceed with the analysis of optimal short-term contracts when piB > pi
]
B.
The following result makes the analysis more transparent, by mapping the condition
VA(e1) ≥ VAB(e1) from Proposition 2 to a line segment.
Lemma 4. Assume piB > pi
]
B. Then there exists a unique value e
], with e < e] < eoA,
such that VA(e1) ≥ VAB(e1) holds if and only if e1 ≤ e]. The level e] decreases with piB.
Hence, only sufficiently low emission targets for the first period can be utilized to
implement an outcome without relocation in any period. By offering more high-powered
incentives in the first period, the regulator enforces a sufficiently high abatement capital
investment by the firm. This renders the relocation option in period 2 unprofitable when
the firm optimally exploits its possibilities to invest in abatement capital. Planning to
relocate after period 1 is, then, no longer optimal from the firm’s perspective, because
staying for only one period in A already involves a fairly large investment. The firm then
prefers to invest even more, and realizes the rents from the investment also in period 2.
Finding the optimal first-period contract, i.e. the first-period emission level e1 that
implements an equilibrium where the firm stays for both periods in country A with
the lowest (total) transfers, is now straightforward. Because VA(e1) is strictly concave,
implementing e1 = e
] leads to lowest transfers and is, therefore, optimal. Regarding
the cost of implementing such an outcome, the total transfer required is given by t1 =
VB − VA(e
]), and the regulator prefers this to immediate relocation whenever t1 ≤ L.
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Figure 2: Optimal first-period contracts with short-term contracting; left: eoA < e
], right:
eoA > e
]. Implementable levels of e1 are shown in red.
Proposition 3. With short-term contracting the optimal first-period contract is
• (t1, e1) = (to, eoA), if piB ≤ pi]B and L ≥ to;
• (t1, e1) = (t], e]), if piB > pi]B and L ≥ t], with t] := VB − VA(e]) > to;
• the null contract otherwise.
In the first two cases the second-period contract is (t2, e2) = (0, e
∗(aA(e1))).
The implications of Proposition 3 are as follows: For moderate relocation profits piB,
the lack of commitment has no consequence for the optimal contract. Both with long-
term and with short-term contracting, a transfer has to paid only in period 1, and the
firm invests enough so that relocation in period 2 is no longer in its interest. Hence, for
moderate values of piB a one-period contract is sufficient to resolve the relocation problem
on a permanent basis, even without regulation in period 2. This case is depicted in the
left panel of Figure 2. Observe that at e1 = e
o
A, it holds that VAB(e1) < VA(e1). Hence,
as the firm has to comply with the emission target e1 in order to obtain the transfer t1
in the first period, the option to relocate in period 2 is effectively ruled out.
However, when the outside option in form of the relocation option is more attrac-
tive, limited commitment affects the design of the optimal contract in period 1, and the
effect can be severe. A tension arises between the regulator’s parsimony, i.e., offering
a sequentially optimal second-period contract that minimizes transfer payments in that
period, and the firm’s opportunism, i.e., considering a ‘take-the-money-and-run’ strategy
(sacking first-period transfers and relocating in period 2). This tension can only be re-
solved by preempting it via a tighter regulation in the first-period. This amounts to a
downward-distortion in e1, that is costly to the regulator. The transfer t1 required to
induce the firm to accept the first-period contract (rather than to relocate immediately)
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is larger than the total transfer under long-term contracting. This case is depicted in the
right panel of Figure 2. An implication of Proposition 3 is, therefore, that with short-
term contracting, the regulator prefers not to avert relocation already for lower values of
the welfare loss L. In this sense, limited commitment leads to more relocation.24
Figure 3 shows combinations of the parameters piB and L for which relocation is averted
under short-term contracting, in comparison with long-term contracting. As the figure
illustrates, the implementation problem that is underlying the results of Proposition 3
becomes more severe when the relocation option becomes more attractive (i.e., for larger
values of piB). In contrast, when piB ≤ pi]B, there is no implementation problem, because
offering a contract in period 1 is already sufficient to avert relocation in both periods. If
piB ≤ pioB then no transfers are needed to avert relocation.
As a consequence of limited commitment also investments are distorted. In particular,
the tougher first-period emission target e1 leads to an over-investment in abatement
capital by the firm.
Corollary 2. Under the optimal sequence of short-term contracts, the implemented in-
vestment level is aoA for piB ≤ pi]B (and L ≥ to), and distorted upwards for piB > pi]B (and
L ≥ t]).
Paradoxically, the distortions in e1 and a can be so severe that the existence of
an investment opportunity in abatement capital can overall be welfare-reducing. In
other words, a seemingly welfare-enhancing investment opportunity, such as investment
in abatement capital, may turn out to be welfare-diminishing if it leads to the described
conflict of interest between the regulator and the firm. This holds if a higher transfer is re-
quired to avert relocation under short-term contracting than in a (hypothetical) situation
where a = 0 is exogenously fixed from the start (and this is common knowledge).
Corollary 3. If piB is sufficiently large then t
] > (1 + δ)(piB − pi
∗
A(0)), i.e. the regulator
would prefer a situation where a = 0 is exogenously fixed.
We close this section by illustrating the above findings in our earlier example.
Example. The firm’s profit when following location plan ‘AB’ with first-period emissions
eoA is given by VAB(e
o
A) =
5
2 −
1
4δ
2 + δpiB. We have V
o
A ≥ VAB(eoA) if and only if piB ≤
pi]B = 3 +
3
4δ. Notice that a
o
A = 1 + δ and hence pi
∗
A(a
o
A) = 3 + δ > piB whenever
piB ≤ pi]B. This demonstrates the lock-in effect, which renders relocation unprofitable
even absent any second-period transfer payment. If, however, piB > pi
]
B a transfer of
t2 ≥ 1δ
{
VAB(e
o
A) − V
o
A
}
= piB − pi
]
B is required to implement the long-term contract.
Provided the firm indeed chooses investment aoA, the sequentially rational second-period
transfer is max{0, piB−pi
∗
A(a
o
A)} = max{0, piB−(3+δ)}. Implementation fails, because the
24We implicitly assume here that there are several firms that are regulated, and the profit from relo-
cation, piB, or some other characteristic varies across firms.
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Figure 3: (piB, L) - combinations for which relocation is averted; grey-shaded area: long-
term contracting, dotted area: short term.
latter is strictly lower than piB−pi
]
B, which mirrors the finding of Corollary 1. The critical
value e] is given by e] = eoA − 2(piB − pi
]
B) = 7 +
δ
2 − 2piB. Consequently, for piB > pi
]
B,
the regulator specifies first-period emissions e1 = e
] < eoA. The resulting first-period
transfer is t] = VB − V
o
A + (piB − pi
]
B)
2 > VB − V
o
A (if L ≥ t]). Investment in this case is
a]A = a
o
A + piB − pi
]
B > a
o
A.
To illustrate the finding of Corollary 3 notice that pi∗A(0) = 2. Hence, in the hypo-
thetical situation where investment is impossible the firm earns a maximal per-period
profit of 2 and relocation can be averted with a transfer of piB − 2 per period. In this
case there is no commitment problem, i.e. relocation can be averted permanently with a
total transfer of (1+ δ)(piB − 2) = VB − 2(1+ δ). Obviously, for large piB this expression
is smaller than t].
5 Extensions
In this section we consider extensions of our main model, and analyze to what extent they
have an impact on the central result of the previous section, regarding the implementabil-
ity of outcomes under short-term contracting. First, we consider a situation where the
firm’s investment is observable to the regulator, but remains non-contractible.25 Second,
we focus on a more general objective function of the regulator, that (apart from the firm’s
location decision) also depends on the firm’s emissions, and allows for a benefit to the
regulator from averted relocation also in case the firm stays for only one period in A.
25Bergemann and Hege (2005) show in a model of project-financing with an infinite time horizon that
non-observability of effort may actually be beneficial because it leads to a form of implicit commitment.
In our model with a finite horizon, observability is always preferable. Nonetheless, short-term contracting
still has severe consequences on implementation.
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5.1 Observable Investment
Observability of the firm’s investment relaxes the implementation problem studied in the
previous section to some extent. The reason is, that the regulator can now make the
second-period contract offer dependent on the level of investment actually chosen by the
firm (and not just the anticipated level of a, as in the previous section). As a result,
also emission levels e1 > e
] can now be used to implement SPNE without relocation.
Nevertheless, we will show that the optimal long-term contract can only be implemented
when VoA ≥ VAB(eoA) (as in the case with an unobservable investment).
Because the regulator now observes the firm’s investment level a, the second-period
contract entails e2 = e
∗(a) and t2 = max{0, piB − pi∗A(a)}, unless the stated t2 exceeds
L (in this case no second-period contract is offered and the firm relocates). Let a be
the investment level that is just sufficiently large to create a lock-in situation in period
2. Hence, it is implicitly defined by the condition pi∗A(a) = piB.
26 For a ≥ a no second-
period transfer is required to avert relocation and the firm’s second-period profit is pi∗A(a).
Otherwise (for a < a), the firm is either offered a contract and does not relocate, or there
is no second-period contract offer and the firm relocates; in both cases, the firm’s profit
in period 2 is piB. Overall, the firm’s discounted profit at the investment stage is
t1 + piA(e1, a) − K(a) + δ
pi∗A(a), a ≥ a¯,piB, a < a¯. (12)
After having accepted the first-period contract, the firm chooses its investment to
maximize (12). The corresponding investment level depends only on e1. For low values
of e1, namely e1 ≤ e], the firm invests aA(e1). Intuitively, the optimal investment when
the firm plans to stay for only one period in country A is, then, already fairly large. The
firm then prefers to invest even more, planning to stay also in period 2, even without
a second-period transfer. This leads to an optimal investment of a = aA(e1). On the
other hand, less stringent first-period emission levels e1 > e
] render large investments
unprofitable, so that the firm ends up requiring a transfer in period 2. But in that case
its second-period profit is always piB, so that the firm optimally chooses a = aAB(e1) even
when it does not plan relocate.
Plugging the optimal investment level back into the firm’s discounted profit, (12),
its profit is t1 + VA(e1) whenever e1 ≤ e], and t1 + VAB(e1) whenever e1 > e]. The
first-period transfer that is necessary to implement some first-period emission level e1 is
thus given by t1 = VB − VA(e1) if e1 ≤ e], and t1 = VB − VAB(e1) if e1 > e]. In the
latter case, also a positive second-period transfer of t2 = piB − pi
∗
A(aAB(e1)) is paid. The
total (discounted) transfer needed to implement a first-period emission level of e1 > e
] is
26Existence of a follows from Lemma 1, result (2).
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VB − VAB(e1) + δ
(
piB − pi
∗
A(aAB(e1))
)
.
Minimizing the total transfer needed to permanently avert relocation leads us to the
following result.
Proposition 4. Assume aAB(e) is concave in e.
27 With observable investment, the
optimal first-period contract is
• (t1, e1) = (to, eoA), if piB ≤ pi]B and L ≥ to;
• (t1, e1) = (t], e]), if pi]B < piB ≤ pitrB and L ≥ t];
• (t1, e1) = (VB − VAB(etrA), etrA), if piB > pitrB and L ≥ ttr;
• the null contract otherwise.
pitrB > pi
]
B is the critical value for piB for which t
] = ttr. The second-period contract in the
third case is (t2, e2) = (piB − pi
∗
A(aAB(e
tr
A)), e
∗(aAB(etrA))).
Hence, in contrast to the case with unobservable investment, the regulator now has an
alternative way to avert relocation, using the possibility to implement a positive second-
period transfer. To this end, the regulator adjusts the emissions target in period 1 to
the level etrA, which induces a sufficiently small investment by the firm. In period 2, the
regulator then pays a transfer that just averts relocation. However, this option creates a
(potential) double inefficiency. Namely, the firm’s investment is inefficiently small (given
e1), and in addition the emissions in period 1 are, in general, also distorted.
28 Since the
actions implemented by the firm in this case do not depend on the value of piB, whereas
the distortions in the case with a lock-in (second case in Proposition 4) are increasing in
piB, the regulator implements e
tr
A whenever piB is sufficiently large (larger than pi
tr
B ).
5.2 Alternative objective function
In our model as presented so far the regulator’s preference only varies in the location of
the firm and not directly in the firm’s productive choices. Adding a preference over the
contractible productive choices of the firm slightly complicates the analysis, but does not
reverse the major result of the paper concerning the implementability of outcomes. In
addition, we will also allow for positive benefits of averting relocation only in period 1.
We will show that also this modification does not alter the main results. Unlike in the
previous subsection, we again assume that a is not observable to the regulator.
27This assumption is sufficient to establish existence and uniqueness of the value etrA . Only mild
assumptions are required to establish concavity of aAB. E.g., in our illustrative example, aAB(e) is
always concave.
28Whether emissions in period 1 are distorted depends on the specified functions. It turns out that in
our illustrative example we have etrA = e
o
A.
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Suppose, the regulator’s payoff can be written as follows:
−χ1 (t1 +D(e1)) − (1− χ1)L1 − χ2 δ(t2 +D(e2)) − (1− χ2) δL2, (13)
where χτ = 1 if the firm operates in country A in period τ (and accepts the contract
offered in that period), and χτ = 0 otherwise. If the firm relocates in the second period
the regulator incurs a loss of L2 in that period, and if it relocates already in period 1
the regulator incurs an additional loss of L1 ≥ 0. Hence, L1 is the regulator’s benefit
of averting relocation only in period 1. We assume L2 ≥ L1, so that the same payoff
structure as in (5) is obtained when L1 = 0, while the regulator has an identical interest
in averting relocation in each of the two periods when L1 = L2. D(e) is a penalty function,
capturing the domestic damages from the firm’s emissions.29 We assume that D(e) is
weakly increasing in e, and that D(e) = 0 if e ≤ 0.
With this payoff structure it is not obvious that the regulator always prefers either
immediate relocation or no relocation, because the regulator benefits also from averting
relocation only in period 1. However, we argue in the following that due to the sunk
costs associated with abatement capital investments, such an outcome is less preferable
to either immediate relocation or no relocation and, hence, cannot arise in equilibrium.
Lemma 5. Under the optimal sequence of short-term contracts the firm either relocates
immediately or stays for both periods.
The intuition is straightforward. If the firm stays for one period, it has to receive
a transfer that compensates it for not relocating in that period. Because investments
are made in the first period, this transfer has to take the investment cost into account.
Because these costs are sunk, in period 2 a lower transfer is sufficient to discourage the
firm from relocating. This implies that whenever the regulator prefers to avert the firm’s
relocation in period 1, then he strictly prefers to avert it also in period 2.
Under limited commitment, the regulator thus seeks to find the optimal sequence
of short-term contracts that permanently avert relocation with minimal total transfers,
taking into consideration also the damages of emissions. If this is too costly, the regulator
offers no contract and implements the outcome where the firm relocates immediately.
In the following we derive necessary and sufficient conditions for the implementability
of such an outcome, that parallel the results in Section 4.2.
To form an equilibrium where the firm does not relocate, the quintuple (t1, e1, t2, e2, a)
again has to satisfy the constraints (PC), (MH-1), and (MH-2). The constraint of se-
29When the firm relocates, it may increase its emissions abroad. If pollution is trans-boundary, the
regulator will take these emissions into account as well. However, they effectively only raise the fixed
welfare loss of relocation and, hence, can be embedded in the parameters L1 and L2.
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quential optimality now reads as follows
(t2, e2) ∈ arg min
t˜2,e˜2
t˜2 +D(e˜2), s.t. t˜2 + piA(e˜2, a) ≥ max{piB, pi∗A(a)}. (SO’)
Because the regulator may now prefer a different level of emissions than the firm also in
period 2, a further constraint emerges. Namely, the firm should not choose a different
investment and thereafter stay in country A also in period 2 without accepting the second-
period contract. This leads us to the following additional moral hazard constraint:30
t1 + piA(e1, a) − K(a) + δ(t2 + piA(e2, a)) ≥ t1 + VA(e1). (MH-3)
We can now extend the central result regarding the implementability of outcomes under
short-term contracting (see Proposition 2) to the generalized payoff structure.
Proposition 5. For a first-period emission level e1, there exists a second-period contract
(t2, e2) and an investment level a such that constraints (MH-1), (MH-2), (SO’), and
(MH-3) are satisfied if and only if VA(e1) ≥ VAB(e1) and D ′(e∗(aA(e1))) = 0.
Hence, our result on implementability, which is the central result of this paper, carries
over to the more general payoff function of the regulator. However, the implementation
of outcomes becomes even harder. The second condition in Proposition 5 requires that
given the firm’s equilibrium investment a, the regulator’s and the firm’s interests in the
second period are fully aligned. Hence, the regulator must have no incentive to distort
the firm’s emissions e2 away from the level that the firm would optimally choose (given
a) in the absence of regulation in that period.
The underlying reason for this result is similar as before. Namely, whenever the
regulator has an incentive to distort the firm’s emissions in period 2, this is anticipated
by the firm, and leads to an adjustment in the firm’s investment in abatement capital.
The regulator, in turn, anticipates this adjustment, and is only willing to compensate the
firm for the distortion in second-period emissions, taking this adjustment into account.
This shifts the reference point for transfers in the second period, so that the firm is
always better off when it plans to reject the second-period contract offer from the start,
and invests in abatement capital accordingly (i.e., a = aA(e1)).
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The only way to escape this dilemma is for the regulator to implement an emission level
e1 that preempts the conflict between the regulator’s and the firm’s interests in period 2.
30For the sake of brevity we did not write down this constraint under the original payoff structure (see
Section 4.2), because there it is automatically satisfied given the constraint (SO). This is no longer true
under the modified constraint (SO’).
31This reasoning also applies if the regulator has an incentive to distort the firm’s emissions upwards
(e.g., in order to trigger a higher choice of output). Anticipating this distortion in the second period,
the firm reduces its investment, so that its optimal (un-distorted) emissions are higher in period 2. The
regulator then only compensates the difference in the firm’s profit when choosing its optimal emissions
in period 2, given this investment, and the emission level preferred by the regulator.
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Given the above specification of the regulator’s payoff, this holds whenever e∗(aA(e1)) ≤
0, which implies D ′(e∗(aA(e1))) = 0.32 Hence, first-period emissions must be set at a
sufficiently low level in order to induce a lock in, and fulfill the above constraint.33
6 Conclusion
This paper identifies a general implementation problem associated with persistent in-
vestments by an agent, that yield returns over more than one period. It arises when the
principal cannot commit to contractual obligations for the full period of time in which the
returns on the investments are incurred. The agent has an outside option, and realizes
that in the future, the principal will compensate her only for forgone profits (due to not
using the outside option) within a period, and not for her prior investment costs. Hence,
the agent is unable to recover the full investment cost, and is better off when she plans to
use the outside option in a future period from the start, which implies lower investment
costs. We show that the principal is unable to implement outcomes where the agent never
uses the outside option and requires a strictly positive transfer in a future period. To
circumvent this implementation problem, the principal distorts the contract offered to
the agent in the first period, where the investment takes place. In particular, by offering
more high-powered incentives, the agent is induced to invest more. The outside option,
then, becomes less attractive, so that the agent no longer requires a positive transfer in
the future and yet refrains from using the outside option.
We frame this general idea in a more specific context. Namely, we analyze the problem
of designing optimal incentive contracts that avert firm relocation. A local regulator
aims to avert a firm’s relocation in each of two periods. The firm, if staying for at least
one period, undertakes some location-specific investment, which is not observable to the
regulator. Contracts consist of transfers and targets for an observable productive activity,
such as the firm’s emissions, output, or employment.
If contracts are long-term, they specify simple subsidy payments, conditional on the
firm’s location. Optimal long-term contracts do not interfere directly with the firm’s
operative decisions. This simple structure results because the interests of the regulator
and the firm are to some extent aligned. Averting relocation with minimal transfers
32Depending on the value of the outside option piB, either the constraint VA(e1) ≥ VAB(e1), or the
constraint D ′(e∗(aA(e1))) = 0 is binding.
33There are other possible modifications of the model that can alleviate the implementation problem.
E.g., suppose that in addition to the variable cost of installing an abatement capital stock of a, there
is a fixed cost that arises only if a is strictly larger than zero. In that case, the regulator can always
induce an investment of zero by setting a sufficiently high emission target for the first period, because
this reduces the firm’s benefit from investing in abatement capital. But as long as a = 0 holds, the local
effects from a distortion in the second-period emission target upon the firm’s investment vanish. This
suggests that – similarly as in the case with an observable investment (see Section 5.1) – the regulator
has an alternative way to circumvent the implementation problem, by setting a sufficiently loose emission
target in the first period.
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requires maximal profits of the firm. Therefore, the regulator has no incentive to distort
the firm’s operative decisions.
With limited commitment an implementation problem arises whenever relocation is
sufficiently attractive. Optimal first-period contracts are then more stringent, and imple-
ment an inefficiently high investment in order to induce a ‘lock-in’. The more attractive
the relocation option is, the tougher the contract needs to be, which leads to larger first-
period transfers. The distortions that arise due to the implementation problem can be
so severe that higher transfers are required to avert the firm’s relocation permanently
than in a hypothetical situation where the firm cannot invest at all – although a positive
investment would be required to avert relocation with minimal transfers.
Our model has an important application in the area of climate policy. When some
countries unilaterally introduce prices for emissions, the competitiveness of their energy-
intensive industries is harmed. In response, firms may be tempted to relocate to other
countries with less stringent environmental regulation. This may be one of the reasons
why the EU initially decided to allocate allowances for free in the EU-ETS. Our results
indicate that such simple subsidies may not prevent relocation on a permanent basis. In
order to be effective in this respect, subsidies should be conditioned upon the fulfillment
of binding criteria such as firm-specific emission levels, output or employment targets.
Such policies are needed whenever policy makers cannot make binding commitments that
last for a sufficiently long period of time.
A Proofs
A.1 Proofs of Section 3
Proof of Lemma 1. Claim (1): e∗(a) is implicitly defined by ∂piA/∂e = 0. By As-
sumption (A1) this value exists and is unique. Differentiating ∂piA/∂e = 0 w.r.t. a and
rearranging yields
∂e∗
∂a
= −
∂2piA
∂e∂a
∂2piA
∂e2
< 0. (14)
Claim (2): pi∗A is strictly increasing by assumption (A5). To prove concavity of pi
∗
A
differentiate twice, using the envelope-theorem, to get
∂2pi∗A
∂a2
=
∂2piA
∂a∂e
· ∂e
∗
∂a
+
∂2piA
∂a2
.
Using (14), this can be written as
∂2pi∗A
∂a2
= −
(
∂2piA
∂e∂a
)2
∂2piA
∂e2
+
∂2piA
∂a2
=
∂2piA
∂a2 · ∂
2piA
∂e2 −
(
∂2piA
∂e∂a
)2
∂2piA
∂e2
≤ 0.
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The numerator is non-negative by (A3), while the denominator is negative by (A1). Hence
the entire expression is negative. Furthermore, (A5) implies ∂pi∗A/∂a > ε > 0 for all a,
which yields lima→∞ pi∗A(a) = +∞.
Claim (3): aA(e) is implicitly defined by the first-order condition
∂piA
∂a
−
∂K
∂a
+ δ
∂pi∗A
∂a
= 0. (15)
At a = 0 the expression one the left-hand side is strictly positive, by (A2), K′(0) = 0,
and (A5). Furthermore, boundedness of ∂piA/∂a by (A2) and strict concavity of K imply
that this expression turns negative for large values of a. Existence of aA(e) then follows
from continuity. Furthermore, piA(e, a) −K(a) + δpi
∗
A(a) is strictly concave in a, because
its components are concave and some even strictly concave, which proves uniqueness of
aA(e). Differentiating (15) w.r.t. e and rearranging yields
∂aA
∂e
=
∂2piA
∂e∂a
∂2K
∂a2 −
∂2piA
∂a2 − δ
∂2pi∗
A
∂a2
< 0. (16)
For aAB(e) just repeat the above steps.
Claim (4): By claim (4) both VA(e) and VAB(e) are well defined. Differentiating VA(e)
twice, using the envelope-theorem, yields
∂2VA
∂e2
=
∂2piA
∂e2
+
∂2piA
∂e∂a
· ∂aA
∂e
=
∂2piA
∂e2
+
(
∂2piA
∂e∂a
)2
∂2K
∂a2 −
∂2piA
∂a2 − δ
∂2pi∗
A
∂a2
=
∂2K
∂a2 · ∂
2piA
∂e2 −
[∂2piA
∂a2 · ∂
2piA
∂e2 −
(∂2piA
∂e∂a
)2]
− δ
∂2pi∗A
∂a2 · ∂
2piA
∂e2
∂2K
∂a2 −
∂2piA
∂a2 − δ
∂2pi∗
A
∂a2
< 0.
Concavity of VAB(e) is proven in the same way (not shown). Using the envelope-theorem,
the first-order condition for maximizing VA(e) is
∂piA
∂e (e, aA(e)) = 0. By (A1) and con-
tinuity there exits some value e that satisfies this equation. Uniqueness follows from
strict concavity of VA(e). Similarly, maximizing VAB(e) yields the first-order condition
∂piA
∂e (e, aAB(e)) = 0, existence and uniqueness follow as before.
Claim (5): aAB(e) is defined by the first-order condition
∂piA
∂a
−
∂K
∂a
= 0. (17)
Comparing this to (15), noticing that pi∗A is strictly increasing and by concavity of the
respective objectives, we find that aA(e) > aAB(e) for all e.
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Proof of Lemma 2. Assume VAB(e1) ≥ VB, which can be written as
VAB(e1) = piA(e1, aAB(e1)) − K(aAB(e1)) + δpiB ≥ piB + δpiB = VB.
But this implies piA(e1, aAB(e1)) > piB and therefore
VA(e1) = max
a
piA(e1, a) − K(a) + δpi
∗
A(a)
≥ piA(e1, aAB(e1)) − K(aAB(e1)) + δpiA(e1, aAB(e1))
> piA(e1, aAB(e1)) − K(aAB(e1)) + δpiB
= VAB(e1).
This proves our claim.
Proof of Lemma 3. As is discussed in the main text, the optimal profit from not relo-
cating is VoA. The profit from immediate relocation is VB. As a consequence of Lemma 2
we have VAB(e1) < max{V
o
A, VB} for all e1. Therefore, the firm prefers immediate reloca-
tion whenever VB > V
o
A and no relocation otherwise. Solving V
o
A = VB for piB leads to the
definition of pioB.
A.2 Proofs of Section 4
Proof of Proposition 1. As is argued in the main text, the regulator’s problem is to
minimize (11) over e1 and e2. This is equivalent to maximizing piA(e1, a) − K(a) +
δpiA(e2, a) over a, e1, and e2. Maximizing first over e2 and a yields VA(e1). Maximizing
this over e1 yields e1 = e
o
A. By comparing the respective first-order conditions we get
e2 = e1. The total transfer required is t
o = VB − V
o
A. The regulator offers this contract
whenever to ≤ L.
Proof of Proposition 2. When (SO) is satisfied, the firm’s second-period profit is t2+
pi∗A(a). By the envelope-theorem, (MH-1) then implies that the firm’s total profit is
t1 + δt2 + VA(e1). This justifies constraint (MH-2
′), as a replacement for (MH-2).
Now first assume VA(e1) ≥ VAB(e1), which can be stated as
max
a
piA(e1, a) − K(a) + δpi
∗
A(a) ≥ maxa piA(e1, a) − K(a) + δpiB. (18)
This implies pi∗A(aA(e1)) > piB, where aA(e1) denotes the maximizer of the left-hand
side. Hence, the second-period contract (t2, e2) = (0, e
∗(aA(e1))) satisfies (SO), given
a = aA(e1). By construction, (MH-1) and (MH-2) are satisfied, given (t2, e2).
Next assume VA(e1) < VAB(e1). Constraints (MH-1) and (SO) imply a = aA(e1) and the
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second-period contract offer entails t2 = max{0, piB − pi
∗
A(aA(e1))} and e2 = e
∗(aA(e1)).
As indicated above, (MH-2) can be replaced by (MH-2′). Therefore, necessary for all
three constraints to hold is δt2 ≥ VAB(e1) − VA(e1) > 0. Further, note that
δt2 ≥ VAB(e1) − VA(e1)
= max
a
{
piA(e1, a) − K(a) + δpiB
}
− max
a
{
piA(e1, a) − K(a) + δpi
∗
A(a)
}
> δ
(
piB − pi
∗
A(aA(e1))
)
.
Therefore t2 > piB − pi
∗
A(aA) and together with t2 > 0, as shown above, we get t2 >
max{0, piB − pi
∗
A(aA)} – this contradicts (SO).
Proof of Corollary 1. The result on implementability follows from Proposition 2.
Regarding pi]B notice that V
o
A > VAB(e
o
A) for piB = pi
o
B by Lemma 2. Because VAB(e
o
A)
strictly increases with piB, while V
o
A is independent of piB, we get pi
]
B > pi
o
B.
Proof of Lemma 4. By the envelope-theorem ∂VA/∂piB = 0 < δ = ∂VAB/∂piB. Fur-
thermore, using aA(e) > aAB(e), it holds that
∂VA
∂e
=
∂piA
∂e
(e, aA(e)) <
∂piA
∂e
(e, aAB(e)) =
∂VAB
∂e
. (19)
Together with VA(e
o
A) = VAB(e
o
A) for piB = pi
]
B (from Corollary 1) this yields e
] < eoA and
e] strictly decreases with piB.
It remains to prove that e] > e for all piB. To see this, notice that VA(e) = VAB(e) at
δ = 0 for all e. Also, ∂VA/∂δ = pi
∗
A(a) and ∂VAB/∂δ = piB. For e → e we have by (A1)
and strictly convex K that aA(e) → ∞. As this holds irrespective of δ, we have that
VA(e) > VAB(e) for e→ e which completes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 3. We determine the cost of implementing an equilibrium with
no relocation. Recall from the proof of Proposition 2 that there is no second-period
transfer. As long as piB ≤ pi]B, by Corollary 1, eoA is implementable and minimizes the cost
over the set of implementable first-period emission levels; the required (total) transfer is
to = VB − V
o
A. If piB > pi
]
B, we have e
o
A > e
]. Therefore, the regulator cannot use eoA
to implement an outcome with no relocation. By the concavity of VA, implementing e
]
requires the smallest transfer, which is equal to t] = VB − VA(e
]).
Proof of Corollary 2. Trivial for piB ≤ pi]B. For piB > pi]B recall that aA(e) decreases in
e (Lemma 1), and e] < eoA. The result follows.
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Proof of Corollary 3. Recall that t] = VB−VA(e
]). On the other hand, the transfer to
avert relocation when a = 0 is given by ta=0 = VB−(1+δ)pi
∗
A(0), and no implementation
problem arises in this case as a is fixed. Therefore t] − ta=0 = −VA(e
]) + (1 + δ)pi∗A(0).
Now, from Lemma 4 we have e] → e for piB → ∞ and by strict concavity of VA this
implies VA(e
])→ −∞. Consequently, t] − ta=0 →∞, which proves the claim.
A.3 Proofs of Section 5
Proof of Proposition 4. We first characterize the firm’s optimal investment decision,
i.e. the maximizer of (12). We distinguish three cases:
i) a¯ ≤ aAB(e1). By concavity of piA(e, a) − K(a) + δpiB (see the proof of Lemma 1),
we have for all a ≤ a:
piA(e1, a) − K(a) + δpiB ≤ piA(e1, a) − K(a) + δpiB = piA(e1, a) − K(a) + δpi∗A(a).
Furthermore, because a¯ ≤ aAB(e1) < aA(e1), we have VA(e1) ≥ piA(e1, a)−K(a)+
δpi∗A(a) for all a ≥ a¯. Consequently, a = aA(e1) maximizes the firm’s profit in this
case and this maximal profit is VA(e1).
ii) aA(e1) ≤ a¯. Similar to the previous case we have for all a ≥ a:
piA(e1, a) −K(a) + δpi
∗
A(a) ≤ piA(e1, a) −K(a) + δpi∗A(a) = piA(e1, a) −K(a) + δpiB.
Furthermore, because aAB(e1) < aA(e1) ≤ a¯, we have VAB(e1) ≥ piA(e1, a)−K(a)+
δpiB for all a ≤ a¯. Consequently, a = aAB(e1) maximizes the firm’s expected profit
in this case and this maximal profit is VAB(e1).
iii) aAB(e1) < a¯ < aA(e1). By the above arguments the firm’s profit has two local
maxima: at a = aA(e1) and at a = aAB(e1), such that the maximal profit is either
VA(e1) or VAB(e1). Because VA(e) > VAB(e) holds if and only if e < e
], we find that
the firm’s maximal profit, given aAB(e1) < a¯ < aA(e1), is thus VA(e1) if e1 ≤ e],
and VAB(e1) if e1 > e
].
Therefore, the firm’s profit after having accepted a first-period contract offer (t1, e1) is
t1 +
VA(e1), e1 ≤ e],VAB(e1), e1 > e]. (20)
We here implicitly assume that the firm always chooses aA(e1) when e1 = e
], although
it is indifferent. This is without loss of generality, because the regulator chooses the
equilibrium, in case there are multiple, and it is obvious that the first-period transfer to
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implement e1 = e
] is unaffected by the continuation, but in case the firm chooses aAB(e
])
the regulator has to pay a strictly positive second-period transfer to avert relocation in
period 2.
The total transfer to avert relocation is given by
t(e1) =
VB − VA(e1), e1 ≤ e],VB − VAB(e1) + δ(piB − pi∗A(aAB(e1))), e1 > e]. (21)
In case e1 ≤ e] this is trivial, because it implies a = aA(e1) > a and therefore a first-
period transfer is sufficient (this already follows from Lemma 4). Now consider e1 > e
],
and suppose pi∗A(aAB(e1)) ≥ piB. This would imply
VAB(e1) = piA(e1, aAB(e1)) − K(aAB(e1)) + δpiB
≤ piA(e1, aAB(e1)) − K(aAB(e1)) + δpi∗A(aAB(e1)) < VA(e1),
which yields e1 < e
] – a contradiction. Thus, pi∗A(aAB(e1)) < piB, so that the minimal
second-period transfer required to implement an outcome with no relocation is t2 =
piB − pi
∗
A(aAB(e1)).
The regulator now chooses e1 in order to minimize (21). The first case (piB ≤ pi]B ⇔
eoA ≤ e]) follows readily from Corollary 1. For the remainder, assume eoA > e], i.e.
piB > pi
]
B. By strict concavity of VA(e) we have
t(e1) = VB − VA(e1) > VB − VA(e
]) = t] ∀e1 < e].
So it cannot be optimal to implement some e1 < e
]. For e1 > e
], the required transfer
is t˜(e1) = VB − VAB(e1) + δ
(
piB − pi
∗
A(aAB(e1))
)
. Denote etrA the minimizer of t˜(e1). By
Lemma 1, the function VAB(e1) is strictly concave. Furthermore, because pi
∗
A is concave
and strictly increasing by Lemma 1, the composition with the concave function aAB(e1)
is also concave. Therefore, t˜(e1) is strictly convex for all e1 ∈ (e, e). Furthermore,
by (A1) and Lemma 1 the minimizer is interior, i.e. etrA ∈ (e, e) exists. Now suppose
etrA ≤ e]. Then t(e]) ≥ t˜(e]) > t˜(e1) for all e1 > e] so that e1 = e] leads to minimal
(total) transfers. Hence the relevant cases are where etrA > e
]. Notice, that t˜(etrA) does
not depend on piB, and that for piB = pi
]
B we have V
tr
A (e
tr
A) < VA(e
]). Because t(e]) strictly
increases with piB and converges to +∞, there exists a level pitrB such that t(etrA) < t(e])
if and only if piB > pi
tr
B . This completes the proof.
Proof of Lemma 5. Suppose the regulator offers (t1, e1) in the first period, which is
accepted by the firm and relocation in period 2 occurs. Denote a^ the equilibrium value of
the firm’s investment. Because the firm relocates in period 2, we must have pi∗A(a^) ≤ piB.
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Regarding the first-period transfer, it has to hold that t1 ≥ VB − VAB(e1), in order to
be accepted by the firm. Furthermore, we must have L1 ≥ t1 + D(e1), otherwise the
regulator prefers not to offer the contract at all. But then we have
0 ≤ L1 − t1 −D(e1) ≤ L1 − VB + VAB(e1) −D(e1)
= L1 − piB + piA(e1, a^) − K(a^) −D(e1) < L2 − piB + piA(e1, a^) −D(e1).
Now, because pi∗A(a^) ≤ piB, the optimal contract to keep the firm in country A in period
2 is the solution to
min
t2,e2
t2 +D(e2) s.t. t2 + piA(e2, a^) ≥ piB. (22)
Clearly, the solution to this is e2 = arg maxe piA(e, a^) − D(e) and t2 = piB − piA(e2, a^).
Together with the above, the regulator’s benefit from offering this contract is
L2 − t2 −D(e2) = L2 − piB + piA(e2, a^) −D(e2) > L2 − piB + piA(e1, a^) −D(e1) > 0,
where the first inequality holds because e2 maximizes piA(e, a^) − D(e), and the second
inequality was shown above to hold. Hence, the regulator strictly prefers offering a
contract in period 2 that averts relocation.
Notice that the method of proof also rules out random relocation in period 2. Hence,
either immediate relocation or no relocation can be optimal.
Proof of Proposition 5. Let (t1, e1, t2, e2, a) be the outcome to be implemented.
Assume first that VA(e1) ≥ VAB(e1) and the second-period contract entails e2 6= e∗(a).
Because D′ ≥ 0 this implies e2 < e∗(a) and thus (MH-1) implies a > aA(e1). But
then pi∗A(a) > pi
∗
A(aA(e1)) > piB. The firm’s second-period profit, including the transfer
t2 = pi
∗
A(a) − piA(e2, a), is therefore pi
∗
A(a), but then (MH-3) is clearly violated because
a 6= aA(e1) is not the maximizer of piA(e1, a˜) − K(a˜) + δpi∗A(a˜).
Next assume VA(e1) ≥ VAB(e1) and the second-period contract entails e2 = e∗(a). Then
(MH-3) is trivially satisfied. Also (MH-2) holds, by the arguments used in proving
Lemma 2. Constraint (SO’) is only satisfied when the regulator indeed prefers to keep
the firm without distorting its second-period emissions, for which the second condition
from the Proposition is both necessary and sufficient.
Lastly, assume VA(e1) < VAB(e1). If pi
∗
A(a) ≥ piB the firm’s equilibrium payoff is
t1+piA(e1, a)−K(a)+δpi
∗
A(a) ≤ t1+VA(e1) < t1+VAB(e1), hence (MH-2) is violated. If
on the other hand pi∗A(a) < piB the firm’s equilibrium payoff is t1+piA(e1, a)−K(a)+δpiB.
Because D′ ≥ 0 we must have e2 ≤ e∗(a) and, therefore, ∂piA/∂a |e2,a> 0 by assumptions
(A1) and (A5), which implies a 6= aAB(e1). Consequently (MH-2) is violated because a
is not the maximizer of piA(e1, a˜) − K(a˜) + δpiB.
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B Restriction to pure strategies
Here we argue that allowing for mixed strategies does not soften the regulator’s imple-
mentation problem identified in Proposition 2. An equilibrium in mixed strategies is
characterized by a randomized strategy of the firm, i.e. a distribution on a subset A of
the real line, and a mechanism that the regulator offers in period 2. By the revelation
principle, the latter mechanism can be assumed to be direct, incentive compatible and
truth-telling.34
For simplicity we focus in our analysis on the discrete case, i.e. where the firm random-
izes over the discrete set of investment levels A = {a1, . . . , an}. Clearly, there must
exist a^ ∈ A which receives no positive rent. Denote the contract this types accepts in
equilibrium as (t^2, e^2). Then it must hold that
t^2 + piA(e^2, a^) = piB. (23)
Now consider the firm’s investment choice. First of all, a^ must maximize the following
expression
t1 + piA(e1, a) − K(a) + δ(t^2 + piA(e^2, a)). (24)
Second, because of (23), a^ also maximizes
t1 + piA(e1, a) − K(a) + δpiB. (25)
Using the first order-conditions for (24) and (25), a^ has to satisfy
∂piA
∂a
(e^2, a^) = 0. (26)
Because the function piA is strictly concave in a for any value e, we conclude that
piA(e^2, a) < piA(e^2, a^), ∀a 6= a^. (27)
Together with (23) this implies
t^2 + piA(e^2, a) < piB, ∀a ∈ Ar {a^}. (28)
Thus, no other type has the incentive to mimic type a^, because any type is guaranteed
a profit of at least piB. But this implies that there exists a second type a
′ 6= a^ that also
receives no rent, because otherwise we could reduce all transfers to types a 6= a^ without
violating any incentive constraint. This type a′ also has to maximize (25). Because (25)
34Because only allocations matter for providing investment incentives to the firm, replacing an arbitrary
mechanism that leads to a particular allocation with its direct and incentive compatible counterpart is
indeed without loss of generality.
34
has a unique maximizer, namely aAB(e1), this leads to a contradiction.
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